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The Communist Manifesto: A Case Study in the Class Politics of Industrialization
Over the tumultuous course of the 20th century, little remained untouched by the ideas
of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels as espoused in their best-known work, The Communist
Manifesto. Yet at the time, the very notion of “communism” was rejected by the powers that
be; as the Manifesto itself explains, “All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy
alliance to exorcise this Spectre (of communism).” It took a monumental event to shift this
concept of a new world from the distant fringes of western politics to the global center stage—
an event which manifested as the sudden and absolute seizure of power in the world’s largest
contiguous nation-state, Russia. The prophecy of Marx and Engels, dismissed for so many
decades, appeared to be coming true. The optimistic Russian workers hoped that it would be
so, while the established aristocracy prayed that it would not. The aristocracy and urban
laborers did comprise all of Russia, though; the fate of the country rested not just in their
hands, but in those of the rural peasants isolated from the major cities, the intelligentsia
debating the merits of one system or another, or the thousands of men under arms mobilized
to fight World War I. Marx predicted that his revolutionary goals would be realized in a stable,
modern, and, most importantly, industrial country, while the Russian Empire was anything but.
Consequently, despite the commitments the Bolsheviks had to the construction of a socialist
society, the underdevelopment and social disorder of post-World War I Russia guaranteed that
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altered adaptations of Marxism, such as those promoted by Lenin, would replace Marx’s
prescribed model.
In order to understand how the application of the communist vision outlined by Marx
and Engels was affected by the conditions of Russia, it is first necessary to examine how the
development of that vision was driven by the conditions at the time of the publication of the
Manifesto. Both Marx and Engels were migratory in their personal lives (appropriate enough,
given the internationalist bent of early communist thought), but most of their time was split
between Germany and Britain. Engels, in particular, came from a family that owned property in
the British city of Manchester, and his experiences in that municipality shaped much of Engels’
image of capitalism. The city of Manchester was, in many ways, the epitome of
industrialization; its great cotton processing plants provided the promise of a new life to lowerclass farmers, who crowded into the city’s dismal slums to get jobs at one colossal factory or
another. In these proletarian districts, living conditions and working conditions alike were
abominable. In particular, diseases and injuries ran rampant, driving the death rate up to one
out of 30.8 persons per year in the 1840s; given that the death rate across all of England and
Wales was one out of every 45 persons per year in the same period, it is reasonable to infer
that the lower classes were in fact safer in the farmlands than in the cities (Boyer).
The class dynamic in 1917’s Russia was entirely different. Though Russia was not strictly
“feudal,” since serfdom had been abolished in 1861, the class hierarchy was still defined mostly
by possession of agricultural land rather than industrial capital. Since the end of serfdom, most
peasants in Russia ostensibly owned the land they lived on, but more often than not, this land
was too small to farm enough on which to subsist. Consequently, most peasants still had to
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work the land of a wealthier benefactor—usually the monarchy, the Russian Orthodox Church,
or a wealthier private landowner. Though some factories did develop in cities like Petrograd or
Moscow, they were largely owned by foreign capitalists, meaning that there was little in the
way of a Russian national bourgeoisie to revolt against (“What Was the Bolshevik Revolution?”).
All of these factors meant that the resentment of the Russian poor was directed at the estate
owners, and not, as Marx and Engels predicted, at the factory bosses.
The Bolshevik Revolution was preceded most notably by the Revolution of 1905. This
revolution occurred in a similar context to its more significant successor; Russia, seen as weak
and backwards after a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, was prepared to
modernize, and the Tsarist system was perceived as an obstacle to be overcome to achieve this
goal (Ulam 218). Nearly all of the opposition groups in Russia saw this as a priceless
opportunity, including the Socialists, a leftist faction that incorporated both the Bolsheviks and
the Mensheviks. However, Lenin’s faction of the Socialists acted at the time with deep restraint,
arguing that it would be self-destructive to try to turn this popular discontent into an explicitly
Marxist movement. This prompted a dispute between the Bolsheviks (of which Lenin was a key
leader) and the Mensheviks, in which the Bolsheviks insisted, in accordance with Marx and
Engels, that it would be no great betrayal to allow Russia to become a modern liberal
democracy and for the Socialists to operate as a party in that system. As one might expect, this
was a controversial position to take, and did not sit well with much of the revolutionary
movement. Even by the time of the uprising of the Petrograd Soviet (“Soviet”, in this context,
refers to a workers’ council), the Bolsheviks remained a minority faction.
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The shift began to arise when the Menshevik faction and their allies the Socialist
Revolutionaries proposed a bizarre system in which the Petrograd Soviet would exist as the
representative of the workers, but would not seize absolute power from the bourgeois
republican Provisional Government until capitalism developed fully. In a reversal of their
previous position, the Bolsheviks defied this proposition (Ulam 321-322). It was ultimately the
appointment of General Lavr Kornilov as commander-in-chief of the Russian Army that pushed
the Bolsheviks ahead; Kornilov was seen as a Napoleon-like figure who would crush the Soviets
and restore one-man rule, granting credence to the Bolshevik claim that armed insurrection
was the only solution (Ulam 357).
For the following analysis of Bolshevik policy, it is essential to keep certain guidelines of
terminology in mind. “Communism” herein shall refer to a classless, stateless society, rather
than to any society administered by a communist party. “Socialism,” in turn, describes any
society in which the ownership of the means of production is public or in some sense collective.
Marx described socialist societies that had not yet progressed to full communism as the
“dictatorship of the proletariat,” which did not necessarily imply autocratic or authoritarian
rule, but indicated that the state was under the control of the working classes. This terminology
will describe states such as the Soviet Union that did not claim to have reached communism but
still identified as socialist (Ollman). “Marxism,” in turn, describes the belief that human history
consists of a sequence of these states, in which one stage of history develops out of the class
struggle of the previous stage, all moving inexorably towards full communism. Finally, for the
sake of clarification, it is worth noting that while many anti-Tsarist organizations in Russia could
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be considered “socialist revolutionaries,” the term Socialist Revolutionaries (or SRs) refers to a
specific political faction, and not revolutionary socialists in general.
The foremost key obstacle to the fulfilment of Marx’s predictions in Russia was the
worker-peasant divide, which skewed strongly in favor of the peasantry due to the lack of
industrial development. Despite the economic reforms of the late 19th and early 20th century,
85% of the Russian population lived in rural areas as of 1917 (Atkinson). Marx and Engels
believed that the heel of capitalist oppression was most keenly felt by the urban proletariat,
and the revolutionary potential of the agricultural laborers had already been spent; the
Manifesto proclaims: “The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the
commune… The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of
industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class.”
University of Toronto Professor of Russian History John L. H. Keep, in his book The Russian
Revolution, recounts how the Russian socialist parties attempted to win over the rural poor.
The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, being primarily urban in their demography,
attempted to assemble a system by which the peasants could be involved in the system of
soviets, but were largely unsuccessful; in the April 1, 1917 issue of the Socialist Revolutionary
newspaper for the Moscow region, the Socialist Revolutionaries proposed an “All-Russian
Soviet of Peasant Deputies” that would oversee a plethora of rural town and village councils;
this ignored that the peasants already had a system of district committees that had wielded
effective political authority since the abdication of the Tsar and it was poorly received by the
peasants (Keep 223).
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In spite of this failure of worker-peasant relations, the Socialist Revolutionaries became
the “default” revolutionary peasant party, but the rural wing of the SRs was much more diverse
and disparate in its views than the urban wing (probably on account of its larger number and
greater geographic spread of constituents), including some who were, for all intents and
purposes, aligned with the Bolsheviks (Keep 230). The Bolsheviks envisioned nothing less than
class war in the farms and villages, in direct defiance of Marx and Engels’ guidelines. Though
this position was controversial with the other revolutionary parties in Russia, and the peasants
were not enthusiastic about the idea of protracted war against the forces of reaction in their
own homes, they were won over by Lenin’s promise of total expropriation of the possessions of
the landowners (Keep 235-236).
As the power and influence of the Bolshevik faction grew, its need to adopt a decisive,
clear plan to liberate the peasants as Lenin had promised became more urgent, but
simultaneously, it was necessary for clear positive economic results to be delivered to the
whole of Russian society. Consequently, the Bolsheviks planned to organize peasant councils,
formed from the poorest and most downtrodden farmers from before the revolution, which
would immediately begin managing the land of the defeated landowners and use them to
produce food for the rest of Russia (Keep 387). These policies exemplified the Bolshevik
attitudes towards the peasants: they promised them liberty and prosperity to unprecedented
degrees, and argued that it was only the interests of the bourgeoisie that kept these hopes
from coming to fruition.
The Bolsheviks initially sought to organize soviets to lead the peasants in revolutionary
activity, but because the party was dominated by urban workers, these soviets failed to
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convince the rural poor that their interests were represented. They were promptly replaced
with “Committees of the Village Poor,” which were more independent of the urban soviets, and
consequently more erratic and unpredictable in their actions. Even then, many rural Russians
declined to participate, causing struggle and instability between pro-Bolshevik and neutral or
anti-Bolshevik peasants (Keep 459-460). This chaos continued to force the Bolsheviks into
micro-management of the farming communities, making bureaucracy, rather than socialism,
inevitable in the countryside. Regardless of how hard the Bolsheviks attempted to placate the
peasants, the sociopolitical disorder and economic development that characterized their lives
prevented them from becoming the ideal revolutionaries Lenin had hoped for. They expected
the adaptation of Marx’s conception of the urban proletariat to agricultural society to be
simple, but this task proved impossible in reality.
Even in the major cities and amongst the industrial workers, a lack of political unity
presented the Bolsheviks with a nearly insurmountable political challenge. Even with the Tsar
and the Provisional Government defeated, the lack of clear central authority allowed nearly
anyone with a sufficient quality of armed personnel to proclaim regional authority, making
armed conflict across the vast nation inevitable. As related by journalist John Reed,
“The Central Rada at Kiev immediately declared Ukraine an independent
Republic, as did the Government of Finland, through the Senate at Helsingfors.
Independent ‘Governments’ spring up in Siberia and the Caucasus. The Polish
Chief Military Committee swiftly gathered together the Polish troops in the
Russian army, abolished their Committees and established an iron discipline… All
these ‘Governments’ and ‘movements’ had two characteristics in common; they
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were controlled by the propertied classes, and they feared and detested
Bolshevism…”
David Killingray, author of The Russian Revolution for the Greenhaven World History
Program, notes that Reed was “An American friend of Lenin who was in Petrograd when the
Bolsheviks seized power.” This makes Reed uniquely equipped to comment on the motivations
behind the Bolsheviks’ seemingly authoritarian actions. His best-known work, Ten Days That
Shook The World, reveals to what extent the fear of the violent counter-revolution that was
constant in the post-revolutionary period influenced their actions. Red Army leader Leon
Trotsky succinctly encapsulated the position of the Bolsheviks at a revolutionary conference on
the Russian press:
He distinguished between the Press during the civil war, and the Press after the
victory. ‘During civil war the right to use violence belongs only to the
oppressed…. The victory over our adversaries is not yet achieved, and the
newspapers are arms in their hands. In these conditions, the closing of the
newspapers is a legitimate measure of defence.’ (Reed)
From this, observers can deduce that, to the Bolsheviks, it was not merely necessary
that the mass media be put in the hands of the working classes, as would follow logically from
Marx and Engels’ concept of socialism, but that the media be reduced by force to a minimum of
action for the sake of securing their newly-won but disorderly nation.
To the well-read student of communism, this statement is likely to evoke Marx and
Engels’ description of German Socialism or “true” socialism. The Manifesto charges that the
German Socialists are guilty of
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“hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative
government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press,
bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the
masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois
movement” (Marx).
Intuitively, one expects that this is exactly what Marx and Engels would support, but
they proceed to explain that the situation in Germany makes the pursuit of such a political
program futile and, indeed, outright counterproductive. As the Manifesto posits:
While this "True" Socialism thus served the governments as a weapon for
fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a
reactionary interest, the interest of the German Philistines. In Germany the
petty-bourgeois class, a relic of the sixteenth century, and since then constantly
cropping up again under various forms, is the real social basis of the existing
state of things. To preserve this class is to preserve the existing state of things in
Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it
with certain destruction; on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on
the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. ‘True’ Socialism appeared
to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic. (Marx)
Though this statement referred specifically to Germany, it sets a precedent for Marx
and Engels that the eradication of “bourgeois” political liberties can only proceed when the
bourgeoisie have been the dominant class for long enough to advance those liberties. It would
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be difficult to argue that that precedent of bourgeois liberal rule existed in agrarian,
monarchist, and barely post-feudal Russia.
Given that Lenin was the most prominent of the Bolsheviks and the architect of much of
their policy, when one questions the motivations behind a policy such as the suppression of the
newspapers, one must first understand the ideological train of thought that led him to such an
idea. In one of Lenin’s better-known works, On the State and Revolution, he asserts that,
if the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a
power standing above society and 'eliminating itself more and more from it’, it is
clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a
violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state
power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this
‘alienation’. (Lenin 315)
A professor of Russian and Soviet history, Harvard’s Adam Ulam notes in his work The
Bolsheviks with regards to State and Revolution that: “no work could be more unrepresentative of its author’s political philosophy and his general frame of mind than this one
by Lenin.” He goes on to describe the book as “almost a straightforward profession of
anarchism” (Ulam 353). It seems unlikely that Lenin wrote State and Revolution as a
propaganda piece intended to do nothing more than ingratiate himself with the movement;
had that been the case, he would have no reason to spend much of it damning his erstwhile
comrades for “unprecedentedly widespread distortions of Marxism” (Lenin 313). Given that
State and Revolution was written and published before Lenin even had the authority to shut
down newspapers, it becomes clear that the Bolsheviks’ seemingly un-Marxist newspaper
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policy was exactly what Trotsky asserted: a security decision forced by the political situation of
the time.
Up to this point in the history of the revolution, obstacles to the development of
socialism in Russia would almost entirely internal. Russia was poor, underdeveloped, had no
established modern political apparatus, and was so disordered as to necessitate the exercise of
grim authoritarianism for the sake of stability. It is curious, then, that most of the Bolsheviks’
solutions to these internal problems were akin to the metaphorical band-aid; they ultimately
pushed the peasants, the media, and anything else that could not be dealt with aside to focus
on other issues. For a radical ideology like Marxism, built on tearing out oppressive social
structures by the roots, this is highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, some problems existed in
Russia that were in no way internal, and because they could not be contained by the policies of
the Bolsheviks, there was no other option than smashing them outright. Foremost among these
was foreign intervention in the Russian Civil War. As John Reed describes, “individual French
and British officers were active these days, even to the extent of giving advice at executive
sessions of the Committee for Salvation,” the Committee for Salvation being the anti-Bolshevik
government body. The Bolsheviks had nothing to offer these western military adventurers; the
existence of the socialist experiment angered the military leaders of countries like France and
Britain were angered by the existence of the socialist experiment. Consequently, the
expeditionary forces sent by the belligerents of World War I could only be driven out by force.
Given the state of civil war, and given that the Bolsheviks had taken it upon themselves
to manage the whole of the Russian economy, they adapted harsh measures in order to ensure
the survival of the new government. The Bolsheviks organized a policy of “war communism,” in
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which the surrender of surplus resources became the product not of loyalty to socialist ideals,
but of martial law. Rather than all resources belonging to the collective, groups of soldiers
claimed foodstuffs from the peasants by force in order to feed the military forces and the
industries immediately necessary for defense (Roberts 243). Unsurprisingly, this negatively
affected the rural population, which constituted the majority of the population at the time.
Shortly after the end of the war, in the early 1920s, Lenin felt able to acknowledge that this had
done more harm than good in many respects, and that a change in policy was needed. Though
Lenin acknowledged “the vastness of our agricultural country with its poor transport system”
and, consequently, the need to collect large amounts of resources in short periods of time to
support the war effort, he was quite clear in declaring that “war communism” should be
reversed (Roberts 253).
While It is impossible to determine the impact of war communism on the course of the
war, and how it might have turned out differently without it, the fact remains that the
combination of war itself and war communism did no favors to Russia’s development. Lenin
began to phase out war communism in favor of the New Economic Policy. He began by
replacing the surplus appropriation that was the core of War Communism with a simple tax, so
that a certain portion of the grain would be taken, but not the entire surplus. Lenin took the
policy a step further by allowing the sale and purchase of the surplus grain that had not been
taxed, restoring some amount of capitalism in the countryside. Market reforms were more
limited in the factories, but still existed; though the state still dictated that the factories should
prioritize necessary goods over luxuries, said necessary goods were bought and sold rather than
distributed (Glaza).
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The development of the New Economic Policy does parallel Marx and Engels in many
regards, but as it applies to capitalism rather than socialism. Consider this excerpt from the
Manifesto, on the development of capitalism out of feudalism:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by
the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most
barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the
heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces
the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels
all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it
compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to
become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own
image. (Marx)

The introduction of the New Economic Policy, which averted the “extinction” promised
by poor infrastructure and war communism through the “cheap prices of its commodities” and
brought “civilization” to still-backwards Russia, seems more reflective of the Marxist conception
of bourgeois capitalism than of socialism.

One can argue that war communism was hardly what Marx and Engels had envisioned
in their prediction of an inevitable communist society, but it was perceived as an inherently
Marxist policy by the Bolsheviks, as argued by Lenin in the Communist Party newspaper Pravda:
“Without comprehensive state accounting and control of production and distribution of goods,
the power of the working people, the freedom of the working people, cannot maintain itself,
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and… a return to the yoke of capitalism is inevitable” (Roberts 247). The New Economic Policy,
on the other hand, was a concession; Lenin would acknowledge that war communism
“assumed that we would be advancing in a straight line,” implicitly admitting that by taking up
the New Economic Policy, he was following a more roundabout road to communism.
Consequently, it is impossible to see the transition from war communism to the New Economic
Policy as anything other than a prime example of the material reality of underdevelopment and
instability forcing the Bolsheviks to, even in their own eyes, abandon Marxian orthodoxy.

Though the influence of the Communist Manifesto is visible in the progression of the
Bolshevik Revolution, its dictates consistently took a backseat to the effects of slow
development and political discord in Imperial Russia. To attribute events in revolutionary Russia
to a few great figures may be appealing, but it is fundamentally fallacious. Analysis of the
period must be grounded, first and foremost, in the conditions of the time. For most Russians,
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky were names that appeared in newspapers or pamphlets and
little more, but the crops they grew, the factories they worked in, and the families they fed
were very real. Where the Russian Revolution is concerned, questions of who—who the people
supported, who they trusted, or who they hoped to see defeated—can never be more
important than questions of what—what they needed, what they wanted, and what they
hoped to avoid. For a select few, the Revolution was a struggle for power, but for the masses, it
was a struggle for survival.
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